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Dr. Greg Beabout is Professor of Philosophy at Saint Louis University (SLU), whose work focuses on virtue ethics. Dr.
Bonnie Wilson is Associate Professor of Economics at SLU, who does work in the field of public choice.
Beabout and Wilson’s article focuses on the peaceful nature of the resolution of Occupy SLU, a remarkable outcome given
the extraordinary tension associated with the occupation’s context and circumstances. They use the insights of the
disciplines of virtue ethics and economics to explain how a situation rife with potential conflict was transformed into a
peaceful exchange.
Abstract
The events of Occupy SLU provide an example of how a situation rife with potential conflict can be
transformed into a peaceful resolution. In this paper, we draw from the disciplines of economics and
moral philosophy to shed light on certain features of the case of the Clock Tower Accords. Viewing
the events of Occupy SLU from the perspective of these disciplines brings into focus several themes
and important distinctions: the difference between a command-and-control-relationship compared with
an exchange relationship; the difference between treating a situation in instrumental terms as a problem
suited to a “technological” solution compared with seeing people and contexts from an
“entrepreneurial” approach where hidden possibilities await realization; and recognizing the importance
of exercising and cultivating good dispositions as crucial for leading well through a period of crisis.
Bringing the perspectives of economics and ethics together to consider this case serves as a reminder of
important connections between the exchange perspective of economics and the virtue ethics tradition
of moral philosophy.
I. Introduction
In the middle of the night on October 13, 2014,
an unexpected scene unfolded at Saint Louis
University (SLU). More than a thousand
protestors streamed onto the campus and settled
in around SLU’s iconic Clock Tower. A short
while later, protestors issued a call over social
media – tents and supplies were needed. So began
the week-long “occupation” of Saint Louis
University, now known by its hashtag:
OccupySLU.
The men and women who occupied SLU weren’t
protesting any action by the university. They were

protesting the social injustice of
marginalized and brutalized black human
beings and communities at the hands of the
state, an injustice made all the more salient
and raw given the recent deaths of three
local, young black men, Michael Brown,
Kajieme Powell, and VonDerrit Myers, Jr.,
all killed by white police officers. Amidst a
confluence of events and geographical
circumstances, SLU, a Jesuit institution with
a social justice mission, emerged as a natural
space for protestors to raise their voices and
concerns. While many affiliated with the
SLU community were supportive of
Occupy SLU, others were not. Some
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trustees, donors, alumni, parents of students,
members of the executive staff, and students alike
called for swift action to remove the protestors, by
force if necessary. The week-long occupation was
tense and chaotic – for the protestors, for
students, for faculty, staff, and administrators. (A
more detailed account of this case in its fuller context is
available here.)
In recent years, U.S. college campuses have roiled
with protest. Arguably though, Occupy SLU was a
singular event in the extent of its tension and in
the manner of its resolution. In this paper, our
primary focus is the manner of the resolution of
Occupy SLU. The tense context in which that
resolution took place, though, is important. Just
two months prior to the occupation of SLU,
Michael Brown, a young black man, was killed by
a white police officer in the nearby St. Louis
suburb of Ferguson. Historical racial tensions and
distrust between the largely white police force and
the majority black community in the area
exploded into weeks of protest and civil unrest.
SLU students (and faculty and staff) were among
those out on the streets of Ferguson, protesting –
and getting tear gassed and shot at with rubber
bullets and wooden baton rounds by police. The
Ferguson protests and the aggressive reaction of
police to them fueled the Black Lives Matter
(BLM) movement. That movement in turn
produced a backlash. Conservative commentators
called for the BLM movement to be named a hate
group. Police groups accused protestors and the
BLM movement of inciting a “war on cops.”
In the midst of all this tension, two further events
produced the critical juncture that culminated in
Occupy SLU. Four days before the occupation of
SLU, another young black man, VonDerrit Myers
Jr., was shot and killed by another white police
officer, two miles from the main SLU campus.
Coincidentally, the very next day was the
beginning of a nationally-promoted “weekend of
resistance” in St. Louis. Visitors poured into the
metropolitan area, among them celebrities such as
Cornel West and Jesse Williams. Amidst the
confluence of these events, protestors —
toughened, emboldened, wisened by their
experiences and encounters on the streets of
Ferguson — occupied SLU, a social justiceconscious institution, but also arguably a
conservative “bubble” of evident white privilege.

Occupy SLU was thus a situation uniquely rife
with potential conflict. Extraordinarily however,
over the course of a week, the potential conflict
was transformed and a peaceful resolution
emerged. The occupation began in the wee hours
of a Monday morning. By Friday, protestors and
the administration had cooperatively engaged one
another and come to a mutually beneficial
agreement that ended the occupation, an
agreement now known as the Clock Tower
Accords. How was a situation rife with potential
conflict transformed into a peaceful resolution?
We suggest that the disciplines of economics and
moral philosophy shed important light on this
question.
Economics and moral philosophy connect and
intertwine in important ways, especially through
the virtue ethics tradition. This relationship may
not, however, be immediately obvious.
Contemporary neo-classically trained economists
are often disciplinary and technical specialists,
adept in the application of mathematical,
computational, and quantitative methods. It is
more common than not that contemporary
economists dismiss ethics, either as self-serving
and therefore fully captured by the homo economicus
construction,2 or as a second-order concern (safely
left to moral philosophers) relative to the
instrumental value of extensive market activity.
Philosophers are sometimes dismissive of
economics as the dismal science, or as too focused
on narrow financial concerns. Historically though,
economists were moral philosophers, deeply
concerned with ethical matters. Adam Smith
himself held the chair of moral philosophy at the
University of Glasgow. 3 Although Adam Smith is
typically identified as the father of economics,
another moral philosopher may more rightfully
claim the title, namely, Aristotle.4 In one view, the
discipline of economics has moved on from
Aristotle and Smith and matters of ethics. In
another view, evident in recent scholarship, the
discipline has begun to rediscover the virtue ethics
of Aristotle and Smith. For example, it is
increasingly understood that Smith’s Theory of
Moral Sentiments not only characterizes morality as
an emergent order just as his Wealth of Nations
characterizes markets as an emergent order,5 but
also that our moral sentiments imply that the
market is both a moral space and a moral teacher.6
Becker7 argues that the concept of rationality,

Jesuit Higher Education 6(1): 19-32 (2017)

20

Beabout and Wilson: Occupy SLU
especially as treated by Aristotle, has the potential
to tie virtue ethics to economic thought, and in so
doing to help us meet head on the rerum novarum
of our age. More general examples of this
rediscovery include Bruni and Sugden,8 who
recently wrote in the Journal of Economic Perspectives
about “Reclaiming Virtue Ethics for Economics,”
and Baker and White9 who have assembled an
edited volume on Economics and the Virtues: Building
a New Moral Foundation.
In the particular context of Occupy SLU, the
disciplines of economics and moral philosophy
connect and intertwine through the virtue ethics
tradition most clearly with respect to the theme of
“relationship.” More specifically, we suggest that a
posture of cooperation, a characteristic of
economic acts of exchange (à la Adam Smith), was
adopted, rather than a posture of coercion. We
further suggest that this may have been facilitated
by an awareness of the ends towards which
human beings should be oriented, along with
practicing the virtues integral to human flourishing
together in a community. Ultimately, the posture
of cooperation avoided a series of formulaic
dictates and instead facilitated a situational and
contextual approach. As a result, an
interdependent community of stakeholders was
recognized, facilitating the transformation of a
situation rife with potential conflict into a peaceful
resolution.
The story of Occupy SLU is a complicated one,
with a large cast of characters: administrators,
staff, faculty, students, trustees, alumni, activists
and protestors. Depending on one’s perspective,
all of those groups of individuals, or only a subset
of them, might be considered stakeholders vis-à-vis
the events of Occupy SLU, not to mention the
Jesuits and members of the local St. Louis
community, among others. It is beyond our scope
to treat fully all involved with and affected by the
events of Occupy SLU. Our treatment focuses
primarily on administrators and on Dr. Fred
Pestello, as president of SLU, in particular, and to
some extent on the protestors and activists. In so
doing, we seek to highlight what seem to us key
choices that facilitated a peaceful resolution; we
do not mean to suggest that no others played
important roles in this case.

The remainder of the paper is organized as
follows. In sections II and III, we focus on the
economic perspective. We first explore how
leadership through exchange relationship rather
than command-and-control management played
an important role in the transformation of Occupy
SLU. We then suggest that an entrepreneurial
approach to problem solving rather than a
technological approach also contributed. In
section IV, we explain how the tradition of virtue
ethics also provides insight and suggests that the
practice of virtue by administrators and protestors
alike facilitated the transformation. In section V,
we address the role of SLU’s mission and Jesuit
tradition. We offer concluding remarks in section
VI.
II. Exchange versus Command-and-Control
In order to understand how an economic
perspective informs vis-à-vis the events of Occupy
SLU, it is helpful to be aware of two distinct ways
that the discipline is defined. Inspired by Lord
Robbins,10 textbooks have long defined
economics as the study of the allocation of scarce
resources among competing ends. On this
account, and in the tradition of modern
neoclassical welfare economics, the economic
problem is a simple matter of mathematical
optimization. In his 1964 presidential address to
the Southern Economic Association, Buchanan11
suggested that economists should turn their
attention away from this “theory of resource
allocation,” and back towards the discipline’s
historical roots and Adam Smith’s observation
that human beings have an innate “propensity to
truck, barter, and exchange one thing for
another.” He advocated for economics as the
study of exchange, a perspective that understands
economics as the study of the pervasive human
activity of cooperation.
It is through the lens of exchange and cooperation
that the discipline of economics informs vis-à-vis
Occupy SLU. There are, after all, two general ways
SLU’s administration might have responded to the
occupation of the campus by protestors: with a
cooperative, exchange approach or with an
adversarial, command-and-control approach.
Exchange relationships are mutually beneficial,
win-win activities. They take place between equals,
in the sense that both parties to an exchange are
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empowered as individuals to make their own
choices as they freely cooperate. While exchange
relationships are ubiquitous, and perhaps most
evident in extensive market activity between
buyers and sellers, command-and-control
relationships govern many of the interactions that
take place within organizations such as firms.
Within firms, activity is coordinated not by prices,
as in market exchange, but by executives and
managers who operate as central planners. Within
firms, individuals are often not empowered to
make decisions themselves, but are obliged to
abide the dictates of their managers. To be sure,
cooperation of a sort is required, but the nature of
the relationship between executives or managers
and workers is that of superior to subordinate. It
is thus often understood that it is the role of the
executive and the manager to take command and
to be in control, so as to ensure the efficient
functioning of an organization. This
administrative management school of thought is
rooted in Henri Fayol’s age-old five management
functions: planning, organizing, commanding,
coordinating, and controlling. 12 While the
increasing complexity of organizations in today’s
dynamic and fast-changing environment has led to
a movement away from organizational structures
oriented to command-and-control, the functions
of management found in college textbooks today
are essentially those identified by Fayol.13 In the
case of Occupy SLU, one might have thus
expected SLU’s administration to respond with
command-and-control actions, as it sought to
fulfill its management function according to
conventional understandings and ways of
proceeding.
Additional forces also may have militated in favor
of a command-and-control, power-based
approach to the occupation. SLU has a long
history of hierarchical and bureaucratic
management, and for many years was governed by
a president with an old-style penchant for the
tradition of command-and-control. He was known
as micromanager and an aggressive CEO with a
my-way-or-the-highway approach to decisionmaking.14 SLU’s board of trustees likewise was
seemingly populated by command-and-controlstyle executives, who perhaps influenced, or at
least reinforced, the former president’s style. For
example, a long-time chairman of the board once
made it clear that he understood the relationship

between the administration and the faculty to be
that of management versus labor. This confidant
of the former president was also known for his
channeling of the legendarily tough CEO Chuck
Knight. A new president was inaugurated at SLU
just ten days prior to the occupation of the
campus. While the new president was, in part,
brought in to change old ways of proceeding, he
inherited an executive staff, a board of trustees,
and institutional structures that had all been
formed and built up in the context of a commandand-control-style approach to management.
When crisis and conflict came to SLU in the form
of Occupy SLU, an impulse to respond with
power-based command-and-control was evident.
It was clear that some of the executive staff as well
as some trustees understood that swift and
decisive action was called for. It was also clear that
Dr. Fred Pestello, SLU’s new president, felt
pressure to quickly seize control, to exercise
command, and to engineer a solution to the
problem of Occupy SLU. After it became
apparent that the campus was being occupied,
Pestello called together his executive staff and
several of the few black members of the SLU
faculty. Once assembled, Pestello put the
following question to the group: “What’s the
quickest way to get rid of this problem?” The
presence of protestors on campus,
notwithstanding their social justice cause, was a
“problem” that begged a solution, a solution that
perhaps could be engineered — with proper
planning, organizing, and coordinating — by the
experts in the room and imposed, via top-down
command-and-control. A number of stakeholders
clearly understood that a particular command-andcontrol-style solution to the problem was both
appropriate and clear: forcibly remove the
protestors. As one parent tweeted, “…do
SOMETHING…It is a PRIVATE campus…We
want our campus back…start acting.” Such views
were commonly expressed publicly via social
media and privately via phone calls to the
university. In this view, the protestors had no
standing, and their presence on the campus’
private property was not justified. Such a
judgment further implied that the “problem” of
protestors on campus was properly solved by the
application of a simple moral rule: if someone
occupies your private property, you are within
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your rights to have them removed, and you should
do so.
Ultimately, Pestello chose not to pursue a rulebased command-and-control-style response to the
crisis confronting him. Instead, he chose to
engage the protestors. Moreover, he did not
engage them from the executive’s or manager’s
typical position as a superior to subordinates.
Instead, he chose to engage them as equals,
through exchange relationship and the
cooperation such an approach implies. Each day
of the occupation, Pestello left his office, went
down into the fray around the Clock Tower, and
interacted with the protestors and community
gathered there. After several days of such
engagement, Pestello invited a small group of the
protestors — two SLU students and two
community activists — to a meeting. Strikingly,
this meeting has been identified as one of the very
first times in the history of the broader
“Ferguson” movement (of which Occupy SLU
was a part) that protestors on the ground were
invited to engage in dialogue and cooperation by
an individual in a position of authority. Previously
the modus operandi of authorities had been
command-and-control-style exertion of force. In
response to the protests on the streets of
Ferguson after Michael Brown’s death, authorities
dispatched militarized police SWAT teams dressed
in full-riot gear to confront the protestors. The
result was violence and chaos. Protestors were tear
gassed and shot with rubber bullets and wooden
baton rounds. LRAD sound cannons were
deployed and dogs brought in to incite fear and
control crowds. A curfew was imposed, and the
Missouri National Guard called in. Although these
events served as a clear lesson for some that force
in the face of protest can be counter-productive,
Pestello’s cooperative approach and dialogue with
the protestors that occupied SLU is nonetheless a
striking contrast.
Dr. Pestello’s attitudes and approaches during his
interactions with protestors remained consistent
with a cooperative rather than an adversarial
approach throughout Occupy SLU. During the
first formal meeting between Pestello and
protestors, Pestello chose not to exert authority.
He issued neither ultimatums nor orders. Instead,
he asked questions and listened. He made
suggestions and solicited reactions. The result was

a mutually beneficial agreement — an exchange in
which the protestors offered things of value to the
university and in which the university offered
things of value to the protestors — that also
provided a basis for an end to the occupation.
Exchange relationships can be fragile.
Cooperation requires imagination, a sense of
fairness, and trust if it is to be sustained. Not long
after an agreement had been made, the protestors
violated that agreement, primarily based on
concerns that the university’s administration could
not be trusted to abide the promises contained
therein. The protestors reneged on a promise they
made to end the occupation by 10:30 a.m. on
Saturday morning. Instead of vacating the Clock
Tower as promised, they asked to speak with
Pestello face-to-face. Pestello would have been
well within reasonable rights to refuse and simply
require that the protestors abide their
commitment and be on their way. Instead, he
chose again to engage and walked from his office
to the Clock Tower to speak with the protestors.
Shortly thereafter, with sufficient trust restored,
the protestors did abide their promise, and ended
the occupation.
In key regards, there is no denying that Dr.
Pestello was in a position of authority relative to
the protestors who occupied SLU’s campus. He
chose though not to exert that authority and not
to address the problem before him with
command-and-control. Rather, he chose to adopt
a position of relative equality, and to engage in a
cooperative process of exchange with the
protestors. In the absence of a counterfactual set
of events, one cannot know if command-andcontrol might have been more effective. It seems
likely though that the exchange approach played a
vital role in the transformation of a situation that
was rife with potential conflict into a peaceful,
cooperative, mutually beneficial end.
Exchange relationship is by definition two-sided;
in practice, such a relationship involves multiple
parties freely entering into an agreement. While
Dr. Pestello held formal authority, in an important
regard, the protestors had a strategic advantage.
Pestello had much to lose from an extended
occupation, in large part because of the significant
pressure he faced from stakeholders such as
command-and-control-minded trustees, members
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of his executive staff, and alumni, as well as
concerned parents. He also had much to lose if a
forced removal of protestors went badly. In that
case, social-justice minded stakeholders would
surely have cried out loudly. The protestors, in
contrast, had little to lose. Interestingly, the
protestors chose not to wield this strategic
advantage and exert their own ability to
command-and-control. They chose instead to
reciprocate Pestello’s engagement and to
cooperate. During the week-long occupation, the
difficult topics of race and class and justice were
discussed in both formal and informal
conversations around the Clock Tower. It was not
unusual in the midst of those conversations to
hear young, black protestors coming to the
defense of Pestello. In addition, it has been noted
by Dr. Stefan Bradley, an historian and expert in
black student movements, that the Clock Tower
Accords — the agreement that ended the
occupation — is par for the course in its content.
One might have expected an agreement reached
through cooperation to have offered more to the
protestors, especially given their strategic
advantage. It may be that in the chaos and tension
of the week-long occupation, it was difficult for
the protestors to organize and ask for more than
they did. It seems likely though that their
willingness to not push harder reflected what they
understood to be honest and fair dealing from
Pestello, honest and fair dealing that they chose to
reciprocate.
III. Entrepreneurship versus “Engineering”
In his employment of an exchange-based
approach to the crisis of Occupy SLU, Dr.
Pestello departed from the more traditional
command-and-control-style approach often
deployed by executives and managers. There is a
second way in which his handling of the crisis
arguably differed from more conventional
management styles. As Lucas’s15 work suggests,
two broad categories of problems confront
managers – “technological” problems and
“entrepreneurial” problems. Conventional
management styles often presume that problems
are “technological” in nature. In describing an
approach to social conflict as treating such cases
as technological problems, we mean treating a
social crisis situation as a problem to be
approached with instrumental reasoning in which

a technical solution can be engineered, based on
given information, and in order to maximize some
objective. Uncertainty may exist, but it can be
measured and entails probabilistic risk. In such a
mindset, ends are taken as given, and both the
ends and various proposed means are taken as
evident. In contrast, the approach adopted by
Pestello in which he agreed to enter into an
exchange relationship with the activists is more
consistent with a conception of the problem of
Occupy SLU as “entrepreneurial.” The
entrepreneurial mindset views goals as emerging,
contingent, subject to innovation, and capable of
being refined, revised, deepened, and qualified. In
the context of entrepreneurial problems, the
operational environment, rather than existing in
isolation, involves numerous actors who each
have their own and possibly disparate plans, and
who do not necessarily share ends. As such, the
executive or manager has a limited ability to
influence behavior and events. In addition, the
information environment may be sparse rather
than complete. The uncertainty faced is, à la
Knight,16 immeasurable and cannot be calculated.
In such a context, the extent to which solutions
can simply be engineered is limited. Such
problems require the application of
entrepreneurial judgment. Executives and
managers who perceive themselves as facing
probabilistic risk are often tempted to engineer
solutions to problems based on assessments of
expected costs and benefits. If in reality the
uncertainty being faced cannot be measured, an
inappropriate pretense of knowledge may impede
the use of judgment in the decision-making
process. While solutions to technological
problems can often be engineered or calculated
and then imposed, entrepreneurial problems may
require a more discovery-based approach and the
application of judgment.
Before addressing the particulars of how the
administration’s approach to Occupy SLU reflects
more of an entrepreneurial rather than a
technological approach to problem-solving, a brief
overview of the economic perspective’s theory of
firms may be helpful. The notion that the
problems faced by firm managers are
technological has its roots in Coase’s17 theory of
the firm. From an economic perspective, the
existence of firms is, at first blush, a puzzle, since
economic theory (and much evidence) teaches us
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that decentralized decision-making by individuals
works. As individuals go about their lives and
engage one another in exchange, markets and
prices emerge. Those prices so effectively
aggregate information and coordinate behavior
that millions of strangers can cooperate with one
another. It is this cooperation on a massive scale
that is understood to have produced the
extraordinary rise in prosperity observed in parts
of the world in roughly the last 200 years. If
decentralized decision-making in the context of
markets is so great, the puzzle then is, why do we
have firms? Firms, after all, are organizations
within which decision-making is centralized and
managers coordinate activity via command-andcontrol. Coase suggested that transactions costs
explain firms — the transactions costs associated
with the bargaining, the wheeling and dealing, the
relationship, required of exchange. Simply put, in
complex, dynamic contexts, exchange has clear
information advantages over command-andcontrol. In sufficiently simple, static contexts,
however, the ease of command-and-control can
dominate the relational work of exchange, leading
to the existence of firms. Perhaps not surprisingly,
as firms and similar organizations have grown in
size and complexity, an alternative theory of the
firm has developed, known as the entrepreneurial
theory of the firm.18 In this view, firm
management is not a simple technological matter
of optimization. Rather, firm management takes
place in a context of uncertainty that requires the
deployment of entrepreneurial judgment.
The situation of Occupy SLU is arguably
characterized by features of an entrepreneurial
rather than a technological problem. The actors
involved did not fully share ends and had
disparate plans. Dr. Pestello was committed to a
quick end to the occupation. Some faculty favored
an extended occupation. Pestello clearly shared
sympathy with some of the goals of the
protestors, as evidenced by remarks he offered in
his inaugural address, just days before the
occupation. He also though prioritized safety and
preservation of fundamental operations during the
occupation. Protestors’ priorities were clearly
different, as education in part through the means
of disruption was one of their goals. While some
students shared protestors’ goals, others very
clearly wanted nothing more than an end to
disruption, so that they might better pursue their

self-interest of maximizing academic performance
— the occupation occurred during midterm week.
Engineering and calculation approaches to
problem solving in the context of an organization
within which individuals pursue shared objectives
may well be feasible. In the context of an
environment populated by individuals pursuing
disparate aims, such approaches seem likely to be
much less effective.
In addition, the events of Occupy SLU may well
have been characterized more by Knightian
uncertainty than by probabilistic risk. Nonetheless,
Dr. Pestello and some of his executive staff were
clearly tempted to engage in calculation of costs
and benefits of various actions, as if the risk they
faced was probabilistic. For example, before the
occupation, Ferguson movement organizers made
contact with Pestello and requested that the
university host an interfaith event in conjunction
with a nationally-advertised “weekend of
resistance,” dubbed Ferguson October. Those
against the proposal couched their opposition in
terms of expected brand and image diminution as
well as tuition dollar losses due to conditional
expected enrollment declines. Those in favor of
the proposal tended to take a more judgmentbased approach, couching their support in terms
of the kind of institution SLU should be and in
terms of duty to hospitality and neighbor, rather
than in terms of calculable costs and benefits.
Ultimately, the latter arguments turned out to be
more compelling from Pestello’s perspective, as he
decided that the event would take place on SLU’s
campus.
Once the occupation was in full swing, discussions
about how to proceed continued to reflect some
presumption of probabilistic rather than
indeterminate risk. Threats such as student
withdrawals, reduced campus visits by prospective
students, decreased applications, and fundraising
challenges were all considered. Provision of a safe
and traditional environment was cited as an
expected benefit of a swift removal of the
protestors. The possibility that SLU students
would be arrested during an effort to forcibly
remove protestors was noted. Throughout the
crisis, Dr. Pestello maintained a commitment to a
quick end to the occupation and prioritized safety
and preservation of fundamental operations.
Seemingly though, he did not base decision-
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making as to the means by which that
commitment and those priorities would be
fulfilled on an optimization strategy that weighed
expected costs and benefits. Rather, he exercised
judgment.
Dr. Pestello’s choice to approach the problem of
Occupy SLU via relationship and exchange was
more entrepreneurial than technological. His
decisions arguably were more reflective of the
exercise of judgment than of the engineering and
calculation of a technical solution. Again, in the
absence of a counterfactual set of events, one
cannot know if the alternative of a more
technological rather than an entrepreneurial
approach might have been more effective. It
seems likely though that his approach was a wise
one given the complex and dynamic nature of the
problem he faced.
IV. Virtue Ethics
In order to understand how insights from
contemporary moral philosophy might add to
understanding decisions made in the case of
Occupy SLU to engage in exchange and adopt an
entrepreneurial approach, it helps to begin with a
review of several features of contemporary virtue
ethics. In contemporary academic moral
philosophy, virtue ethics has emerged as one of
three major approaches to normative ethics. For
much of the 20th century, especially in the Englishspeaking world of academic philosophy, two
approaches to ethics were prominent, and each
focused on the morality of actions. One approach,
deontology, emphasizes duties and universal
human rights; another approach, utilitarianism,
emphasizes the consequences of actions.
According to these two approaches, the task of
moral philosophy is to provide a rationally
justified standard for right action; individual
desires and goals are taken as given, and actions
are subject to moral constraints so long as these
can be justified.
Contemporary virtue ethics emerged as a response
to problems in the action-based frameworks of
modern moral philosophy, and as a response to
the apparently interminable debates between and
within advocates of deontology and utilitarianism.
Elizabeth Anscombe,19 in her landmark essay,
“Modern Moral Philosophy,” argued that

philosophers should abandon those frameworks,
and instead retrieve insights from the earlier
tradition of the virtues, especially from Aristotle.
Anscombe’s20 proposal and the ensuing debates
have generated a vast literature, including
contemporary reformulations of virtue ethics, a
renewed interest in ancient traditions that
emphasize practicing the virtues, feminist
contributions that have shifted the debates in
moral philosophy away from focusing on discreet
actions in light of detached standards such as duty
and utility to consider the importance of
cultivating desirable dispositions, attending to care
and relationships, and renewing emphasis on
questions of character, context, narrative,
tradition, and increased awareness of the
importance of setting, perspective, shaping
desires, and cultivating traits integral to
responsible agency, healthy relationships, and
human flourishing. Thus, in contrast with
tendencies in utilitarianism and deontology to treat
human actions as discreet, isolated fragments,
virtue ethics involves not only a renewed emphasis
on character and community, but also a different
sort of epistemology, one which implies continuity
over time and attentiveness to developmental
characteristics of human knowing along with the
dispositions and situated character of human
existence in concrete historical contexts and
communities. Accordingly, there is a sense in
which contemporary virtue ethics re-cast the
concerns of moral philosophy as a sort of postmodern response to the frameworks of modern
moral philosophy, though there is another sense in
which virtue ethics has involved a retrieval of premodern concerns with developing those qualities
of character and intellect that make for a good
human life. In any case, contemporary virtue
ethics has taken its place within the discussion of
contemporary moral philosophy as a distinctive
and prominent mode of moral reasoning.
As noted in section two above, in order for
cooperation in exchange relations to be sustained,
several dispositions are required: a creative
imagination that sees hidden possibilities, a sense
of fairness, and the judgment and confidence
requisite to enter and sustain trust. Virtue ethics,
with its distinctive grammar, provides a highly
developed account of such dispositions. A virtue
is a cultivated disposition, that is, an acquired
human quality that persists across time in various
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contexts. The virtues allow one to take up the
quest with others in pursuit of worthwhile goods.
The pursuit of worthwhile goods includes
acknowledging that it is helpful to interact with
others in shared deliberation and debate about
which goods are worth pursuing in the context of
a particular setting. The virtues are acquired first
by imitating those more excellent than oneself;
deliberately repeating and perfecting the good
actions of an exemplary model confirms and
consolidates desirable dispositions. Accordingly,
desires are shaped by one’s actions, and awareness
of this makes it possible, to some extent, for one
to educate one’s desires, especially by deliberately
taking up the role of an apprentice on the journey
toward mastery of a worthwhile social practice.
The virtues hinge on four central excellences that
perfect powers of life integral to each human
person and well-formed community. Courage
brings order and excellence to the urge to fight or
flee. Moderation tempers and completes the
appetites, especially for food and physical touch.
Justice is ordered balance within oneself and in
relation to others. Practical wisdom or prudence is
excellence in thought guiding action, allowing one
to approach the truth regarding the best course of
action by discerning a situation in its full
complexity, recognizing multiple perspectives. All
the other virtues hinge on these four cardinal
excellences; the greater theological virtues (faith,
hope, and love) flower from these, and countless
lesser virtues are corollaries. Thus, patience takes
courage, gentleness requires moderating feelings
of anger, and gratitude flows from justice to
recognize and respond to gifts granted, and so
forth. Practicing the virtues in difficult situations
requires approaching complicated social conflicts
with a creative imagination, good judgment,
confidence, hope, and an ability to discern when it
is appropriate to treat another person as
trustworthy.
The virtues are developed as one increasingly
comes to understand oneself as a responsible
agent who is a member of a community.
Practicing the virtues involves understanding the
narrative of one’s life and seeing oneself as a coauthor in the narrative of one’s life-journey. This
includes cultivating one’s powers of memory and
imagination with an awareness of both where one
has come from and where one might be going. It
also includes an awareness that one is a character

in the life-journey of others; as such, one is a
member various communities. The various
communities of which one is a member, and the
various traditions of those communities, are
situated and limited in certain ways. Thus,
practicing the virtues involves recognizing that
one lives in a world composed of many
communities and traditions. The virtues are
integral both to the task of becoming a
responsible member of the communities and
traditions of which one is a part, and to the task of
encountering other communities and traditions.
Finally, because human existence is a gift we did
not give to ourselves, and because any human who
is a responsible agent has relied on the gifts of
many others who made it possible to develop
through periods of vulnerability and dependence,
the virtues are required for participating in various
relationships of giving and receiving, including
relationships in which we voluntarily enter, and
relationships in which we find ourselves as a result
of circumstances not of our own making.
With this brief background, we might consider
how the vocabulary of virtue ethics helps us learn
lessons about leadership from the case of Occupy
SLU, and how the virtues play a role in exchange
and in exercising judgment in the context of an
entrepreneurial problem. First, it is worth noting
that in the case of Occupy SLU, the cast of
characters is complicated; many people played
various kinds of leadership roles in this case. In an
obvious way, Dr. Fred Pestello played an
important leadership role in this case. He had to
practice the virtues at several key decision points
in this case: in his decision to practice hospitality
to welcome an inter-faith program related to the
protest movement on SLU’s campus, and in his
decision to practice humility by seeking out the
advice of African American faculty members
throughout the occupation and calling in a
consultant at the beginning of the occupation, and
then to listen to the faculty’s and the consultant’s
suggestion that he should not act from fear, but
should instead make a mission-based decision. At
the same time, many others practiced the virtues
during the events in this case. Listing all of these,
and considering the virtues practiced by each,
would quickly become tedious, since many people
played a role in the complex events of this case.
Certainly not every action in this case was an
exercise of the virtues, but many people did play
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various sorts of leadership roles, and frequently
those individuals did so while practicing the
virtues. Despite tensions and difficulties, this case
included many acts of hospitality, patience, selfcontrol, generosity, courage, persistence, civility,
kindness, hopefulness, solidarity, caring,
teamwork, creativity, foresight, and good
judgment. Rather than seeking to assemble a list
of those who practiced such virtues — the SLU
administrators, faculty, staff, students, Jesuits, and
others associated with the university, along with
activists and others who played a role during this
case — it seems more helpful to focus on one
important chapter in the case: the decision of the
administrators and the activists to engage one
another in a relationship of trust ordered toward
seeking an agreement to end the occupation.
The decision to begin that process, and then work
together toward a shared agreement, involved the
exercise of the virtues. Both the leaders of SLU
and the leaders of the activists practiced civility
when they agreed to meet with one another to
work toward a shared agreement. In doing so, a
relationship that included obvious conflict was
able to move forward by virtue of a shared
willingness to treat potential combatants as human
beings with dignity, self-direction, and intelligence,
that is, as persons who have concerns. In doing
so, those on both sides of the dispute were able to
engage one another as human persons with whom
one can enter into a relationship of mutual
exchange.
We acknowledge that some who are comfortable
with the framework of virtue ethics might find it
jarring to glide from a description of agents as
“persons who have concerns” or as persons able
to engage with others as people gifted with
intelligence and freedom to a description of the
relationship as occurring in a spirit of “mutual
exchange.” Such a description might seem to
some as oddly economic, and thus divorced from
the domain of ethics. This sort of objector seems
to presume that economics is a zero-sum game,
and that economists are concerned solely with
zero-sum contexts in which one person’s gain
involves another person’s loss. In response to
such an objector, several things might be noted.
First, when we appeal to the spirit of mutual
exchange that is the concern of economists, we
have in mind positive-sum games in which each

party exercises intelligence and freedom to enter
into a mutually beneficial relationship. Further,
while we acknowledge that mutually beneficial
exchange can be conducted with attitudes and
approaches that are not consistent with the
complete exercise of virtue, we want to note that
lack of virtue is not integral to exchange
relationships, while the practice of the virtues in
relationships of mutual exchange helps the
relationship go more smoothly, as in the ordinary
case of buyers and sellers. The one who objects
that relationships of mutual exchange are merely
economic and thus incompatible with “ethics”
may have presumed a suppressed premise that we
think is false: in particular, there is a notion found
in Kant’s duty ethics that an action is moral only
when it is difficult for an individual in that it
strains the individual’s non-moral inclinations and
is done from solely a sense of duty.21 In contrast,
the tendency in virtue ethics, with its emphasis on
the character of the agent, is to affirm the moral
worth of actions done from virtuous dispositions
such as honesty, generosity, and justice.
Accordingly, actions in an exchange relationship
may be morally praiseworthy, including when the
participation in such an exchange promotes the
self-actualization of the agents involved. Thus,
drawing from the language of economics to
describe the relationship between SLU’s
administrators and the activists as an “exchange
relationship” is not intended to reduce the
relationship to a kind of “moral bartering” that is
incompatible with practicing the virtues; to the
contrary, we see the two disciplines as
complementary in the way each brings into focus
features of a complex relationship.
Thus, recognizing that an exchange relationship
may involve the practice of the virtues where the
parties in the exchange each have something to
contribute, we can ask whether certain virtues are
most integral in such a relationship. Our answer is
rather traditional: the virtues most crucial for such
a relationship include justice and practical wisdom.
Doing so requires an awareness of the needs and
desires of others. An exchange relationship may
not be motivated by a sense of moral duty or an
allegiance to a set of impartial obligations or
human rights binding upon all rational agents, nor
need it be motivated by a calculation that the
exchange will produce the greatest benefits for the
greatest number; however, such a relationship
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does seem to involve a willingness to treat the
other party to the exchange as a self-directed
practical-reasoner.
We might puzzle about the following question: in
a conflict situation, what motives does one have
for viewing others as potential parties to an
exchange relationship? More specifically, we might
wonder about the specific individuals in this case:
Why did Dr. Pestello seek to address the crisis
through negotiated-exchange rather than through
command-and-control? Why did he have patience
on the last day of the occupation when it seemed
that the negotiated agreement was falling apart?
Why did the activists decide to trust Dr. Pestello,
even as some among them were raising skeptical
concerns? These sorts of questions seem to point
to the important role that SLU’s mission and the
Jesuit tradition played in the events of Occupy
SLU.
V. The Role of Mission and the Jesuit
Tradition
To reflect on the role played by SLU’s mission
and the Jesuit tradition in the events of Occupy
SLU, it is helpful to begin by noting the important
relationship between the virtues and tradition.
Alasdair MacIntyre, an important voice in
retrieving the emphasis on the virtues, has argued
that virtues are integrally connected to social
practices and traditions:
So when an institution — a university,
say, or a farm, or a hospital — is the
bearer of a tradition of practice or
practices, its common life will be partly,
but in a centrally important way,
constituted by a continuous argument as
to what a university is and ought to be or
what good farming is or what good
medicine is. Traditions, when vital,
embody continuities of conflict.22
On this view, a tradition always includes ongoing
debate about what it means to be part of the
tradition. Typically, this debate is instigated by two
sources. On the one hand, young people who are
at the point in their lives in which they are
transitioning from childhood acceptance of one’s
tradition to an adult embrace of one’s tradition go
through a period of dialectical engagement with

one’s tradition, calling into question apparent
inconsistencies within one’s tradition. On the
other hand, members of a tradition who
encounter other traditions encounter challenges
from the perspective of those in the other
tradition. After all, it is common for members of
any given tradition to recognize both benefits and
inadequacies in alien traditions. Engaging a
tradition other than one’s own involves making
oneself and one’s tradition vulnerable to praise
and criticism from the perspective of the other
tradition. Any tradition that loses the ability to
make itself vulnerable to the perspective of others
and their challenges — from its own members
who are young or from contrarian gadflies or
from the perspective of other traditions — is
“dying or dead.”23
The events of Occupy SLU certainly involved
challenges to SLU’s mission and to the Jesuit
tradition. SLU’s mission is “the pursuit of truth
for the greater glory of God and for the service of
humanity.”24 Those who emphasized the last part
of the mission, “the service of humanity,” tended
to see the concerns of the activists as consonant
with the social justice concerns of the Jesuits since
the time of Pedro Arrupe, S.J., with his
reformulation of the purpose of the society in
terms of a faith that does justice. On the other
hand, some alumni along with some who were
part of the SLU community emphasized the
importance of having a safe and beautiful campus
as a place where members of the community can
engage in “the pursuit of truth for the greater
glory of God.” After all, it’s quite reasonable to
expect that the university and its agents —
especially the administrators and the trustees —
would be concerned first and foremost with the
safety of the students, especially since the
occupation began at the beginning of midterm
week.
Something led Dr. Pestello to discern that
emphasizing the social justice aspect of the
mission as more consonant with what SLU “is and
ought to be.” That something may have been the
Jesuit charism and emphasis on becoming
“contemplatives in action.” Jesuit mission is
service of faith and promotion of justice, in
dialogue with diverse cultures and in collaboration
with many women and men of good will. Jesuits,
in other words, act, and they act on the ground,

Jesuit Higher Education 6(1): 19-32 (2017)

29

Beabout and Wilson: Occupy SLU
for and with others — rather than from a place of
isolation. The protestors were led to SLU by this
charism. By choosing to engage in exchange, both
the protestors and Pestello lived it out.
One might also wonder what helped Dr. Pestello
adopt a posture of humility in so many instances
throughout the occupation, especially given our
modern society’s expectation that executives and
others in positions of authority be demonstrably
in command. Again, Jesuit charism may have
played a role. Daley25 points out that the “third
degree of humility” arguably lies at the heart of
Ignatian spirituality. The third degree of humility
calls a Jesuit to “poverty with Christ poor, rather
than riches, insults with Christ loaded with them,
rather than honors.”26 Perhaps it also called both
Pestello and the protestors to accept and work
within the uncertainty they faced, rather than
attempt to govern and control their environment
and those around them. Perhaps it also helped
both Pestello and some of the protestors bear
some of the insults they were subjected to when
they chose cooperation and rejected coercion, and
when they chose reciprocity and rejected their
own surplus maximization. A posture of humility
may also have made it easier for Pestello to
discern that the conditions for a technological
solution to the problem that he faced simply did
not exist, and that an entrepreneurial approach
was needed. The truth can, after all, be
complicated.
Finally, we might raise the following question.
Granting that SLU’s Jesuit mission played a role in
helping Dr. Pestello, the protestors, and many
others involved in this case, was the Jesuit mission
a crucial or necessary condition for the outcome
of this case? Suggesting that the Jesuit tradition
and SLU’s mission did play a crucial role, as we
have done, seems to imply some unreasonable
conclusions. Does it suggest that such an outcome
is possible only at a Jesuit school? This seems too
strong, for there are other contexts that encourage
engaging in exchange relationships, an
entrepreneurial mindset, and practicing the virtues.
Also, many students educated at Jesuit institutions
will find themselves as members of organizations
that do not have the same sort of mission to draw
from in moments of crisis. The example of those
involved in this case, and the way decisions were
made, while certainly shaped by the particular

context in which people involved in the case acted
with awareness influenced by features of the Jesuit
tradition and SLU’s mission, also seems to
transcend the particularity of SLU with its
distinctive mission to show it is possible to engage
others in a relationship of exchange and work with
others toward an innovative solution by practicing
the virtues.
VI. Concluding Remarks
The events of Occupy SLU were extraordinary in
a number of regards, perhaps especially so for the
way in which a situation rife with potential conflict
was transformed into a peaceful, cooperative
exchange. It is perhaps important to acknowledge
that even while such a claim seems evident, our
treatment has not attempted to situate the events
of Occupy SLU within the larger framework of
research on social movements or attempted a
comparative analysis of Occupy SLU with other
protests and means of resolution. We hope that
other scholars will take up that project.
It is difficult to know whether there might be
generalizable lessons with respect to social conflict
to be drawn from the events of Occupy SLU. In
particular, it could be that the conditions under
which social conflict can be transformed into
exchange are specific and narrow. Coase,27 for
example, taught that exchange can overcome the
problem of externalities if property rights are clear
and transactions costs are low. Are there such
conditions under which exchange can overcome
the problem of social conflict? In the case of
Occupy SLU, a kind of transaction cost problem
was overcome in the sense that the group of
individuals that actually came together to
construct the Clock Tower Accords was small,
facilitating agreement. The transformation of
social conflict into an exchange may well require
that an identifiable, relatively small group of
people can come together and engage. Another
important condition was seemingly evident in the
case of Occupy SLU. Namely, both “sides”
recognized that the other had something to
contribute. Clearly, Dr. Pestello, in his role as the
president of SLU, had resources he could offer in
various forms to the protestors. Pestello also
seemingly recognized that the protestors had
something to offer to SLU as well. A willingness
to see the other side of a social conflict as having
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something to offer may also be a condition
required for the transformation of social conflict
into exchange. A comparative analysis of Occupy
SLU with other protests might be a fruitful
exercise for identifying additional conditions.

reveals the complicated nature of decision-making
and teaches the art and practice of discernment.

There are a number of other lessons one might
draw from the case of Occupy SLU. For example,
the events of Occupy SLU suggest that leaders
facing problems in complex, dynamic contexts
should consider the means of exchange
relationship as an alternative to command-andcontrol, and might find it helpful to be able to
perceive the problems they face as entrepreneurial
in nature, rather than technological. The events of
Occupy SLU further suggest a vital role for the
perspective of virtue ethics in leader formation.
During the occupation, Dr. Pestello as well as
protestors certainly faced any number of dilemmaladen decision nodes. It seems evident though that
the transformation of conflict into cooperation
was driven far less by the application of moral
principles and far more by the practice of virtues.
Throughout the events of Occupy SLU, it seems
evident that questions such as “What kind of
person should I be?” “What kind of institution is
SLU?” guided decision-making and action in
helpful ways.

1

Lastly, we note that the events of Occupy SLU
highlight the important role of discernment in
effective leadership. Certainly, an exchange
approach to leadership will not always dominate a
command-and-control approach. How is a leader
to choose which approach to apply to which
problems? Likewise, some of the problems leaders
confront are technological in nature while others
are entrepreneurial. How is a leader to decide
which kind of problem is being faced? Some
decisions may be best made through the
application of a moral rule, while others may call
for a virtue ethical approach. How is a leader to
pick the best philosophical approach for the
decision at hand? Another key Jesuit charism
provides guidance: discernment. Ignatian
discernment entails distinguishing between ends
and means, choosing the means best suited to
achieving the end, and detaching from anything
not intrinsically valuable. In today’s complex,
dynamic world, it may be that Jesuit education
becomes most distinctive and formative when it
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